Page 441 - 《期货和衍生品行业监管动态》(2022年合集)
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期货和衍生品行业监管动态




                        在接受银行的和解提议时,CFTC 认可其在执法部门调查此事期间的实质性


                   配合。CFTC 指出其已通过减少民事罚款的形式认可该银行的实质性配合和补救


                   措施。


                   CFTC Charges Swap Dealer for Failure to Supervise Valuation Activities on

                   Two Derivatives Trading Desks (2022/9/6)


                        The Commodity Futures Trading Commission today issued an order filing and

                   settling charges against Natixis, a global bank and swap dealer, for failure to

                   diligently supervise traders on the bank’s New York-based Interest Rate Derivatives

                   Desk (IRD Desk) and its Equity Derivatives Flow and Solution Trading Desk (FAST

                   Desk). The traders on the IRD Desk and FAST Desk separately engaged in

                   misconduct by mismarking their positions for the purpose of either inflating profits
                   and minimizing losses, or to “smooth” out returns, respectively. The order requires


                   Natixis to pay a $2.8 million civil monetary penalty, cease and desist from violating
                   applicable provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) and CFTC regulations,

                   and comply with certain conditions and undertakings.


                        “Swap dealers must comply with their supervisory and regulatory responsibilities

                   under the CEA and Commission regulations, and ensure that their valuation controls

                   are properly calibrated to ensure that derivatives positions reflect fair value,” said

                   CFTC Acting Director of Enforcement Gretchen Lowe.


                        Case Background


                        The order finds that Natixis failed to diligently supervise the activities of the IRD

                   Desk.   Between January 2015 and at least April 2018, a trader on the bank’s IRD

                   Desk submitted false or misleading entries in the bank’s internal recordkeeping and

                   accounting system relating to the marking of the end-of-day USD LIBOR forward

                   curve (Closing Curve), for the purpose of inflating the unrealized profit and loss (P&L)
                   of the desk he managed and disguising significant trading losses. Specifically, the

                   trader engaged in a pattern of marking the Closing Curve in a manner that varied from



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