Page 18 - 期货和衍生品行业监管动态(2025年2月刊)
P. 18

期货和衍生品行业监管动态




                   example of this. Unfortunately, ISDA’s analysis has shown that the US Basel III rules

                   and the capital surcharge for global systemically important banks (G-SIB) would

                   increase capital for six US G-SIB client clearing businesses by $7.2 billion, which is

                   equivalent to more than 80%. This punitive tax is completely at odds with the

                   post-financial crisis policy objective to promote greater use of central clearing and

                   would negatively affect market stability. We have set out the steps that are necessary

                   to fix this issue and will continue to advocate for those changes so the provision of

                   vital client clearing services is not compromised.


                        This comes at a time when the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)

                   is due to introduce mandatory clearing in the US Treasury market from the end of this

                   year. ISDA has been leveraging its experience in derivatives clearing to help firms

                   prepare for this transformational change, but the prudential framework must also be

                   calibrated appropriately.


                        As it stands, the proposed US capital rules don’t recognize cross-product netting

                   for transactions based on US Treasury securities and interest rate futures. Services like

                   these allow firms to obtain initial margin efficiencies from offsetting trades in a

                   portfolio of transactions, reflecting reduced risk, but there is no commensurate benefit


                   from a capital perspective under the standardized approach for counterparty credit risk.
                   As more Treasury securities and repos are cleared under the SEC rules, the lack of


                   recognition of cross-product netting will constrain bank balance sheets and limit their

                   ability to offer client clearing.


                        We also think changes are necessary to the supplementary leverage ratio (SLR),

                   which is inconsistent with the objective to improve the efficiency and resilience of the

                   Treasury market, as we pointed out in a letter to prudential regulators last year. The

                   SLR acts as a non-risk-sensitive binding constraint on banks that can impede their

                   ability to act as intermediaries, including their capacity to offer client clearing. We are

                   pleased to hear Federal Reserve chair Jerome Powell acknowledge in testimony to the




                                                              4
   13   14   15   16   17   18   19   20   21   22   23